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IwsuneNcE CoNsuMER CouNspr'ts Cor-uMN
THn 6.FIOUSSHOLDtt On ttF¡,vlllv" ExCLUSION IN AUTO POr'rCrnS
¡ v Pnor¿sson Gn¡c Muivno
Casualty insurers often limit or member of the family of claims brought by a family member
their risk by precluding certain the insured residing in the of pefsonlivingwiththeinsured'u
classes of p.rrår, from coverage. same household as the in- I(eeton and widiss note that'
For example, automobile insur- sured."l in the first half of this century' the
ance carriefs commonly seek to family exclusion was consistent
preclude famiìy members from re- The Personal Auto Protec- with the existence of statutes and
covedng damages against an in- tion form drafted by the Insurance decisions granting tort immunity
sured under the insied's liability Services Offices, Inc., trade organi- for inßa-family, inter-spousal' and
coverage. Also, ÆrrÍTmîr.* g,ufst-Yassenger
even though u claims'' Flence' in
family membet 
-.-r--^^ r-^--r--r^-+ ^t^:* 
L975' in State
may, under tort Insurers believe they can reduce fraudulent claims Fatm Mutual
law, be ..legally by precluding defense or indemnity on claims brought Auto. rns. co. v.
entitled to re- by ã fa-ily Ãtmbet or person living with the insured' Leatyrs the Mon-
cover" from a tar'l SuPteme
.amed insured rrrrfrÍlmlllflrr court upheldboth the tort doc-
on an auto pol- 
,,-,nc,rre¡ nr z.nrio¡for the orooerty ie of interspousal immunity anclrcy so as tå invoke uninsured o ttton f r  pt perLy/casualtyin- trin
underinsured motorist covefage, sufaflce induslry, states: the insurance household exclusion
the policies will often preclude that Ultimately, however' the courts be-
fu rty member from being an '1Ë,/e do not provide Liability gan to abrcgate the doctrines of
"insufed" so as to block the bene- Coverage." For bodily injury tort immunifv' In Montana' in
fìts of the UM or UIM coverage. to you or a "far,'tli *".r,- MiIIet v' FaIIon County,e the
Such preclusion applies even to l)er""2 court overrurned a long line of
ftiends in some cases and is most cases in which the stafe had re-
,"ffiir^ur" rn the policies in the "Family Member" is defined tained interspousal tort immunity,
form of the ,.famrly exclusion" or in the ISO form as "a person re- noting that "Famìly harmony will
,n.::r,orr"rrold excíusion." lated to you by blood, maittiage or not be de:troyed by the filing of a
One would expect a"famrly adoptioí-hoi, a resident of-yo.r, lawsuit."1o The court said, "The
exclusion,, to be drafted to pre-."Á household. This includes a ward or destnrction 
-of famlly harmony 
is
members of the insured's family foster child."3 even less of a concern because oi
From recovering benefits under a Absent any statutory restric- insurance. A spouse is normally
covefage the insured has pur- tion, it is in the power of the in- not seeking redress against the
chased, while a .'household exclu- surer to insert such exclusions into other spouse'Oll: Bt slou¡es 1n
sion,, would prevent persons who the policy. The parties to the insur- surarlce czrfler"'' In I'ransameflca
reside with the insured from recov- ancå contrzct can limit the insurers rns. co. u- Royle,l" the court abro-
ering. In fact, the language of the liabiliry, and the policy controls so gated intra-fam1ly tort immuniry
exclusions i, .o--oãly äi*"d to lo.,g as the rnsurer pâys as agreed'o holding that a parent is not im-
include both classes, u.rd, fo, prrr- ThJ reason advancãd for including mune from liability to a child' In
poses oF this article, the terms will the family or household exclusions that case, the court noted that ìt
be treated as interchangeable. in the ptt.i"t has tieen the in- was pfopef to consicler the
The family or household ex- surer's iea, of collusion by family 'þrevalence of liability insurance"
clusion will commonly take such members in seeking to recover lia- in deciding whether parental im-
form as: ' bility coverage wheìe one membet munity from ,"children's suits
was drivinglhile others were pas- should apply." Ironically, the
..This insurance does not ,".rg"rr.u IÃsurers believe they can courts were abrogating the famlly
apply under Coverage A to .edJce fraudulent claims by pre- tort immunities in part because of
bodily iniury to any insured cluding defense or indemnity on the existence of insurance, while
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the policies still uniformly con-
tained îamrly exclusions negating
the insurance.
Historically, the Montana
Supreme Coutt had upheld the
family/household exclusion in the
auto insutance policy. In 1968, in
Lewis v. Mid-Century fns.
Co.rra the court affirmed that the
household exclusion was not pro-
hibited by Montana's Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Responsibility Act,1s
which was enacted in 1951, and
only applied to require basic
amounts of insurance if a iudg-
ment had not been paid. This
changed when the Montana Lgrr-
lature passed the MontanaManda-
torv Liabilitv Protection A.ct in
tr¡ig.to Thai A.ttt required that
any motor vehicle registered and
operated in Montana had to be
insured against liability for bodily
injury and property damage in
amounts set forth in the Motor
Vehicle Safery Responsibility Act.
The public policy statement inher-
ent in the Mandztory Liability Pro-
tection Act provided new opportu-
nity to challenge the validiry of the
farnily exclusion. Consequently, in
Transamedca fns. Co. v. Royle,
the court declared the family exclu-
sion invalid on the ground that the
Mandatory Liability Protection Act
required insurance against bodily
injury to "any person" and made
no exception for family members.
Said the court, "T'he legislature has
expressly outlawed the'household'
exclusion."lo It is also important to
note that the court in Transamet-
ica v. Royle invalidated the house-
hold exclusion on the alternative
basis that the clause "failed to
honor the reasonable expectations
of the purchaser of the policy."ln
reached similar conclusions
Consequently, as wâs f e-
flected in Shook v. State Farm
Mut. fns.,2' Stot" Farm modified
its household exclusion to liability
"Coverage A" to read:
There is no coverage'.x * * 2.
For any Bodiþ Injary to: ...(c)
an1 insared or 
^îy member of
an insared'¡ family residrng in
the in¡ured's household to the
extent the limits of liability
of this policy exceed the lim-
its of liability required by
law.
Under this clause, the family
member's recovery under the lia-
bility coverage is limited to $25,000
(the amount stated in the Motor
Vehucle Safety Responsibility Act
and required by reference in the
Mandatory Liability Protection
Act).
In Shook v. State .Farm,
husband, Terry, was driving a mo-
tor vehicle in an accident in which
his wife was injured and subse-
quently brought a neglþnce action
against him. State Farm refused to
tender the liabilitv limit of
$100,000 but instead offered the
$25,000 limit under the modified
household exclusion placing the
validity of the modified exclusion
in issue. Federal Judge Hatfield
held that "an exclusionary endorse-
The "modified" household ex-
clusion limiting coverage to the
stâtutory minimum
lØhen the courts invalidated
the family exclusion for liability
coverage on the ground that it vio-
lated public policy as expressed in
the Mandatory Liability Protection
Act, some insuters responded by
modifying the clause so that it only
precluded indemnity of a family
member for amounts over the min-
imum required by the statute. In-
deed, the court in fowa Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Dauis'o seemed to invite
them to do so. Dauis involved the
exclusion of a named driver which
exclusion the court declared invalid
as violating the Mandatory Liability
Protection Act. Flowever, the
court, in dicta, said:21
Our ruling does not, how-
ever, prohibit 
^n 
insurer
from entering into agree-
ments with their insureds to
limit coverage to the statu-
tory minimum amounts as
set forth in S 61-6-103,
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ment which operates to limit cov- mother, Lois, and NFU paid only The court also adopted reasoning
erage to the statutory minimum $25,000 under the exclusion tefus- from the T'hird Circuit case of
amounrs established by MC,A, $ó1- ing the $100,000 policy limit. Wotldwide Undetwdtets fns.
6-301 is notviolativ" áf th" p"utlt In cole,the named insuted, co' v' Bnd¡?s distinguishing be-
policy inherent in Montana's Mary Jo Cole suffered substantial tween the terms "unclear" ând
mandatory insurance law." How- injury when her daughter Lindsey "ambiguous." The Montana Court
ever, Judge Hatfield went on to drove a vehicle into her. She de- found that, for a person of average
find that the positioning of the manded from T.I.E. the liabiliry intellþnce untrained in law, the
exclusion in relation to the broad limits of $500,000 on the Cole pol- provisions of the NFU policy in
language of the basic coverage icy and received $25,000 pursuant Liebrand and the TIE policy in
agreement created an ambiguity in to the modified household exclu- Cole prcvided no means by which
the exclusion the insured could
which ran afoul nÍlllnm*- know the limit of
of the reason- liability available
able expecta_ The court found the policy provisions in question in when a farr,lly
tions of the each case to be c'unclear and ambiguous" and member was the
insured. For declared them invalid and unenforceable' injurecl claimant.
that reason)
he denied
State Farm's
request to declare the exclusion
valid and dismiss Shook's action.
The issue of the validrty of
the modrfied household exclusion
reached the Montana Supreme
Court in 1994 in companion cases
certified from the United States
District Court for Montana. In
Liebnnd v. National Fatmers
Union Ptopetty and Casualty
Co. and Cole v. Ttuck Insut-
ance Exchangeo iniured famtly
plaintiffs were each denied the
right to recover liability limits on
the ground that a modified house-
hold exclusion precluded them
from recovering anything more
than the minimum limits required
under the Mandatory Liabiliry Pro-
tection statute. In Liebrand, the
policy excluded "bodily injury to
you or any relative to the extent the
limits of liabiliry of this policy ex-
ceed the limits of liability required
by law." In policy renewals,
Liebrands received a declarations
page that stated that "[]iability
payments to household members
are limited to the Financial Re-
sponsibility limits of the policy
state." Gordon Liebrand was badly
iniured in a vehicle driven by his
sion. That exclusion which ap-
peared by endorsement to the pol-
icy, precluded coverage "Arising
out of the liability of any insured
for bodily injury to you or a family
member to the extent the limits of
liabiliry of this policy exceed the
limits of liability required by law."
Cole's declarations page simply
provided for bodily injury and
property damage liability coverâge
in the amount of $500,000 for each
occurrence and gave no notice of
the limitation of recovery by family
members.
The court found the policy
provisions in question in each case
to be "unclezr and ambiguous" and
declared them invalid and unen-
forceable.,{.ccordingly, the court
declined to rule on whether they
violated the insureds' reasonable
expectations or were void as con-
trary to public policy of the state.
The court found persuasive the
reasoning in Shook, that determi-
nation of whether there is ambigu-
ity requires analysis of the language
of the policy 'îtilized from the
viewpoint of a consumer of aver-
age intelligeflce, not trained in the
law or in the insurance business."2a
The court found
the provisions
ambiguous ancl
unenforceable.
Moreover, the courr
prospecLively warned of risk that
any cIaùîted provision would still
be deemed unconscionable in light
of the fact that these are contracts
of adhesion that "arbitrarily pte-
clude full coverage for famtly
members, as opposed to all other
persons "in a market in which fam-
ily members cannot obtarn full cov-
erage. Consequently, the modified
household exclusion in its present
form appears to be an unenforce-
able provision in auto liability cov-
erage, and it has a good chance of
being held unconscionable if it is
challenged after being better
draFted For clarity.
The household exclusion in
Underinsured Motorist Coverage
In Stutzman v. Safeco fns.
Co.rzu the court reviewed a Safeco
policy definition of "underinsured
motor.vehicle" that constrtuted a
famîly exclusion.tT It provided:28
But underinsured motor ve-
hicle does not include any
motor vehicle: ...(3) owned
by or furnished for the regu-
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lar use of the named insured
or any relative...
Stutzman was suing her hus-
band, John Turcotte, for damages
she suffered arising from his negli-
gence in operating a motor vehicle
in which she was a passenger. She
cited Ttansamerica v. Doyle for
the proposition that the family ex-
clusion was invalid as violative of
public policy in
Monr^n^.
Flowever, the
court refused to
invalidate the
fzmrly exclu-
sion as applied
to underinsured
motorist cover-
age on the ground that "there is no
statutory mandate for undetin-
sured motorist coverage in Mon-
tatra." She also argued that the
household exclusion to UIM cov-
erafìe was unconscionable insofar
as it prohiblted her from recover-
ing the UIM benefit solely because
it was her husband who iniured her
as opposed to a third parry. The
court disagreed saying that she had
the "meaningful choice" of pur-
chasing additional liability insur-
ance. To rule otherwise, the court
said, would be to convert the UIM
coveraÉle into liability coverage, a
step the court was unwilling to
force on insurers.
Given the fact that UIM
coverage is not the subfect of any
statutory mandate in Montana,
challenges to family or household
exclusions defeating the coverage
cannot rely on the public policy
inherent in such legislation. How-
ever, other provisions defeating
underinsured motorist coverage
have been successfully attacked on
other public policy grounds that
may apply. For example, ín Ben-
nett v. state Fatm Mut. Auto.
fns. Co.r'n the court invalidated an
"other insurance" clause that
would have prevented the stacking
of a husband and wife's respective
limits of UIM coverage on their
two cars. The court said:
The public policy embodied
in these decisions is that an
insurer may not place in an
insurance policy a provision
that defeats coverâge for
FIowever, other provisions defeating underinsured
motorist coverage have been successfully attacked
on other public policy grounds that may apply.
which the insurer has re-
ceived valuable considera-
tion.
The court, in Bennetg re-
fused the argument that such pub-
lic policy does not apply to UIM
because it lacks the protection of a
statutory mandate, and said: "The
purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage is to provide a source of
indemnification for accident vic-
tims when the tortfeasor does not
provide adequate indernnifica-
tion."3o Finally, the court dealt
with the insurer's assertion that
Bennetts had no reasonable ex-
pectation of stacking their UIM
coverages by citing the fact that it
had, in Ttansamerica v. Royle,
invalidated the household exclu-
sion on the ground that "it did
not honor the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured."31 Ar-
guably, these public policy state-
ments could be used to invalidate
household exclusions in UIM
coverage insofar as they defeat
UIM coverage for which the in-
sured has paid, and the insurer
has received, valuable considera-
tion.
The "household/vehicle"
exclusion
The household exclusion
may take many forms. For in-
stance, in Stuøman, the court up-
held an exclusion that removed
from the policy definition of under-
insured motor vehicle any vehicle
"owned by or furnished for the
regular use of the named insured
ot 
^ny 
relative."32
The court also
enforced a
"household/ve-
hicle" exclusion
in Ameilcan
Family Mutua(
fns. Co. v.
Livengoodr33 
^case in whuch American Family
Mutual insured under separate
policies the vehicles of two people
who resided together. Nancy Hen-
mnger was driving a van owned by
her roommate, Arthur Frehse
when she was involved in an acci-
dent with Livengoods who were
riding a motorcycle. American
agreed to defend Livengoods' law-
suit and indemnify Henninger un-
der the liability coverage on
Frehse's van but would not tender
the coverage on Henninger's vehi-
cle, because it contained z
nonowned automobile exclusion as
follows:
This coverage does not ap-
ply to: 'k x x 9. Bodily Injury
or property darnage arising
out of the use of a vehicle,
other than your insured car,
which is owned by or fur-
nished or avzllalle for regu-
lar use by you or any resi-
dent ofyour household.
Livengoods, in appealing the
lowet court's decision enforcing
this household/vehicle exclusion,
asserted that the exclusion was in-
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valid for violating the Mandatory
Liability Protection Act, citing
Ttansameilca v. Royle. The
court disagreed saying that, in
Royle, the policy precluded cover-
age for infuries to relatives which
violated the statute requiring cov-
erage for "all persons." The court
said that Henninger's policy com-
plied with the statute by providing
coverage for all persons and only
precluding cov-
erage if she
used a vehicle
owned by a res-
ident of her
household. The
court also re-
fected the argu-
ment that the
exclusion violated the reasonable
expectations of the'insured saying
that the pohcy clearly demon-
sttated an intent to exclude cover-
age when Henningsen drove a car
owned by a resident of her house-
hold.
Does the household exclusion
of liability trip the UM
coverage?
A true advocate, when de-
nied liability coverage for an in-
juted family member because of a
household exclusion, will atgue
that the vehicle has then become
uninsured so as to trip the limits of
the UM coverage. Invariably the
injured famrly claimant will, by
standard UM definitions, be an
"insured" entrtled to benefits un-
der the UM coverage erther by
reason of being a passenger occu-
pying the vehicle or by being a
farnlly member. On this issue,
there are many cases in jurisdic-
tions other than Montana holding
that denial of liability coverage to
the iniured family member does
not make the vehicle an uninsured
motor vehicle.3o However, there
are exceptions. In tohnson v.
State Fatm Fite Cas.35 the court
held that, where a farlllly exclusion
precluded liability for a passenger
who lived with his uncle and
cousin, the vehicle was rendered
"uninsuted" entttling the family
member claimant to'UM coverage
benefits. A nonowned vehicle ex-
clusion likely will apply to the UM
coverage precluding the injured
family-member passenger from re-
covering if injured in a czr ddven
by a resident of the household.
This amounts to what we might
call a "household/vehicle exclu-
sion." However, notice that such
zÍr exclusion would not block
claims under the UM coverage of
cars parked at home in the garage
and not involved in the accident.3ó
Residence of children of
divorced parents
It goes without saying that an
insurance clause that attempts to
exclude those "residing in the same
household" will raise issues regard-
ing the residence of children sub-
ject to custody arrangements. For
example, in the California case of
National Auto. & Cas. v. Un-
detwoodr3'the court held the term
"resident" to be ambiguous. There,
the children were in custody of the
father but were injured as passen-
gers in their mother's vehicle while
v¡ith her on scheduled visitation.
The court held they were not ex-
cluded from recovery by the
household exclusion to the liability
coverage on her vehicle, because
they were not tesidents of the same
household.
Conclusion
The household or family ex-
clusion appears in various forms in
the casualty policies. To the extent
counsel can show it violates the
terms of a stalute providing for
mandatory liability coverâÉle oI
uninsured motorist covetage, the
court will invalidate it and refuse to
enforce it. Otherwise, the exclu-
sions generally will withstand pub-
lic policy argu-
ments. On the
other hand, if the
provision can be
shown to violate
the reasonable ex-
pectations of the
insurance con-
sumer, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court may well
strike it. Because exclusions from
coverage must be strictly construed
against the insurer, counsel should
review any form oF household ex-
clusion for ambiguity. Finally,
household exclusions that defeat
liability coverage may open the
door to argument that the vehicle
has been rendered 'funinsured" scr
as to invoke UM coverage espe-
cially on those vehicles in which
the injured family member is an
"insured" and which are not in-
volved in the accident. Courts in
Montana will scrutinize household
exclusions carefully, if counsel ade-
quately prepares the challenge.
This is fair, since the exclusion
from coverage of that class of
claimants who are fzntly members
or live under the same roof appears
to be arbitrary, unflecessary atd, in
practice, unjust.
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Because exclusions from coverâge must be strictly
construed against the insurer, counsel should review
any form of household exclusion for ambiguity.
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